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Abstract   
 
The causal efficacy of a material system is usually thought to be produced by the law-like 
actions and interactions of its constituents. Here, a specific system is constructed and 
explained that produces a cause that cannot be understood in this way, but instead has novel 
and autonomous efficacy. The construction establishes a proof-of-feasibility of strong 
emergence. The system works by utilizing randomness in a targeted and cyclical way, and by 
relying on sustained evolution by natural selection. It is not vulnerable to standard arguments 
against strong emergence, in particular ones that assume that the physical realm is causally 
closed. Moreover, it does not suffer from epiphenomenalism or causal overdetermination. The 
system uses only standard material components and processes, and is fully consistent with 
naturalism. It is discussed whether the emergent cause can still be viewed as ‘material’ in the 
way that term is commonly understood.  
 





Are all causes in nature material in the sense of being ultimately equivalent to law-like 
interactions of matter-energy, in any combination? The success of the natural sciences over 
the last centuries suggests that this might be true. The material basis of life is understood in 
increasing detail, and the same goes for the neural basis of mental processes. Descartes’s 
dualism, which assumed that an immaterial mental substance interacts with matter, has 
become untenable. Similarly, it is clear that living organisms do not contain a mysterious life 
force, an élan vital, which was assumed by the vitalists. There is overwhelming evidence, 
nowadays, that physiological and neural systems are fully composed of physico-chemical 
processes. 
Nevertheless, there are puzzling phenomena in living organisms that seem to have a non-
material flavour – phenomena such as agency, intentionality, and consciousness. Are these 
phenomena indeed completely produced by law-like material interactions? Below it is shown, 
by construction, that the answer need not be affirmative. The constructed system is maximally 
simplified in order to make it comprehensible and explainable. It shows that an autonomous 
cause can emerge from a realizable system that is purely material. The construction depends 
on a subtle interaction of deterministic and random processes. Moreover, the emergence 
requires sustained evolution by natural selection. Importantly, the emergent cause is 
ontological (related to what exists ‘out there’) and not merely epistemological (related to 




The construction can be fully realized with components at the level of chemistry and 
basic cellular physiology. Actions and interactions at these levels have been studied 
extensively, and there is little doubt about the reality of the entities involved (such as 
molecules and biological cells). The construction thus stays away from lower and higher 
levels with a more uncertain ontology, such as fundamental physics (where the ontological 
interpretation of quantum physics is uncertain) and the behavioural and cognitive sciences 
(where the ontological status of mental phenomena is uncertain). The main point here is to 
show that well-understood entities can be combined in such a way that an ontologically novel 
entity emerges that has novel causal efficacy. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the main result of the article, by 
constructing and explaining a system that produces a strongly emergent cause. Section 3 
discusses the system, in particular with respect to indeterminacy, causation, emergence, and 
materialism. Section 4 states the conclusion. 
 
2 Construction and explanation 
 
This section presents and explains a minimal material system from which a novel and 
autonomous causal factor emerges. The system is intended as a proof-of-feasibility: the 
purpose here is to show that the proposed system works and indeed produces strong 
emergence. The system is not intended as a faithful model of any existing system. Existing, 
living systems are far more complex, with more complex heredity and physiology. Moreover, 
the X process that is assumed in point (2) below has not yet been identified and investigated 
empirically; hence, its actual existence is not known, even though it is physiologically 
realizable. Consequently, the system and its evolution have a novel causal structure that has 
not been studied in biology1. The minimal system was proposed and analysed computationally 
by van Hateren (2015). However, it is analysed here specifically with respect to the question 
of strong emergence, and it is formulated in a fully non-mathematical, yet self-contained 
form.  
The proposed system combines three causally complex ingredients: evolution by natural 
selection, random2 structural change of which the variability is systematically modulated 
(which is a novel ingredient), and cyclical causation. The statements below are specifically 
intended to clarify the intricate dynamical feedback structure of the system3. They include 
some redundancy and comments (usually included in sections following ‘Note that’), because 
a minimal explanation would become incomprehensible if even a single clause were 
misinterpreted. The explanation of the basic dynamics of the system does not depend on a 
 
1 It resembles a population of organisms undergoing Darwinian natural selection, with the crucial 
difference that conventional natural selection depends on a rate of random change (R) that is either 
fixed or at least not systematically modulated by an internal estimate (x) of each organism’s own 
evolutionary fitness. 
2 The terms ‘random’, ‘randomness’, ‘determinate’, ‘indeterminate’, ‘nondeterminate’, and 
‘deterministic’ are used, throughout this article, in an ontological sense (that is, they do not refer to 
epistemic uncertainty about the system under consideration, but refer to the presence or absence of 
intrinsic randomness within the system itself). See also Section 3.1. 
3 Feedback always utilizes implicit time delays, which produces a cyclical rather than a circular causal 
structure. Therefore, the statements should not be interpreted as a static logical system, because that is 
likely to produce the buzzer fallacy (Bateson 1979, 58-60, shows that treating the functional 
description of an electromechanical buzzer as a logical system produces ‘if P, then not P’). In 
particular, the recursion that the system seems to contain (by utilizing an estimate of fitness to produce 
a gradual increase of fitness) is only apparent, because of time delays and differences in timescales 




particular conception of causality, but uses whatever seems clearest. Several points require 
more discussion than would be consistent with a lucid presentation. Such points are deferred 
to Section 3. As a guide to the reader, Fig. 1 illustrates the overall structure of the mechanism 
and its causal consequences. However, a diagram of this kind cannot depict the dynamic and 
stochastic aspects of the system, and several details are omitted for the sake of clarity. The 
reader should therefore rely primarily on the explanations below. 
 
(1) Assume a collection of systems S of various forms, embedded in a changing environment. 
The systems have a fixed lifetime and reproduce continuously. They are being modified 
continually, gradually, and randomly, each at a variable rate R. The fitness f of system S is 
defined as a variable that quantifies its capacity and tendency to reproduce. The fitness of 
each system varies from moment to moment, depending on system modifications and on 
environmental change. The latter is assumed to happen continually and to be partly random. 
Fitness f can be thought to be produced by a fitness process F, which properly combines all 
relevant factors and dynamics within S and its environment. 
Note that each individual system varies continually throughout its lifetime, that fitness 
varies during that time as well (i.e., as a propensity to reproduce at each point in time, and not 
as a post-mortem reading of actual reproduction), and that fitness is defined here as a variable 
that applies to an individual system (i.e., not to a population of systems and not to specific 
traits of a system). It is here not necessary to specify which structural modifications of a 
system S (compared to the parent of S) are heritable and are thus transferred to the offspring 
of S. However, at least some such transfer of modifications is needed in order to enable 
evolution by natural selection. 
 
(2) Assume an internal process X that has gradually evolved within S. X has a time-varying 
output value x that modulates the rate R by which S is modified. This is accomplished through 
conventional causal mechanisms (e.g., by modulating the efficiency of repair mechanisms of 
random changes of S). Modulation is performed in such a way that R is a decreasing function 
of x, that is, R is high when x is small, and R is low when x is large.  
Note that R quantifies the rate of random, undirected modifications, again occurring 
throughout the lifetime of S. This implies that large R produces large variability in the 
structural changes of S, and small R produces small variability. Thus, x modulates how much 
structural variation of S one can expect: much variation when x is small and little variation 
when x is large. Because X is part of S, x produces structural variation of X as well. 
Therefore, X varies continually during the lifetime of S. 
 




(3) Systems S drift randomly through the (high-dimensional and abstract) space of possible 
structural forms (abbreviated to ‘form-space’ below). This drift through form-space occurs 
continually, because systems are being modified continually. It follows from (2) that systems 
are more likely to linger at forms that produce a large x than at forms that produce a small x. 
This is so, because systems drift away more quickly from forms with small x (since the rate of 
change, R, is high there) than from forms with large x (since R is low there). Purely for 
statistical reasons, forms that produce large x appear sticky, whereas forms with small x 
appear repellent. 
Note that the above mechanism produces clustering (in form-space) around forms that 
produce large x, at least when observed at the level of a population of systems. Individual 
systems only cluster in a probabilistic sense, by having an increased likelihood of acquiring 
and sustaining a form with large x. Because the mechanism is purely statistical, a system only 
gradually responds to changes of X and x (that is, changes in which parts of form-space 
produce large x; such changes can be produced by environmental changes of the input to 
process X as well as by changes of the structure of X). Thus, the relation between cause (x) 
and effect (probabilistic clustering) is gradual and slow: it takes time.  
Formally, drifting through form-space is analogous to how molecules drift—in a random-
walk-like manner—through a fluid or gas in a diffusive process (e.g., of a drop of ink in 
water). Such processes are not instantaneously effected, but slowly and gradually. More 
specifically, the current mechanism would be analogous to diffusion in a volume in which 
there is structure in the speed of diffusion, such as a volume of water with zones of different 
temperatures. Ink particles would then gather mostly in the zones with low temperature, 
because they are expelled more quickly from the zones with high temperature (which produce 
a higher speed of diffusion). 
 
(4) Assume further that X has evolved to be, in effect, an estimator that produces x as an 
estimate of the fitness f of S. The term ‘estimator’ is used here in the modern statistical sense 
of a method (here realized as the process X) that produces an estimate (here x) of the value of 
a variable (here f). The process X may, for example, get input from evolved sensors about 
environmental factors relevant for fitness. Such factors are then used to produce an x that is 
likely to have, at least roughly, a similar value as f, and that is likely to mimic, at least 
roughly, how f varies from moment to moment. The similarity (or ‘correspondence’ in the 
colloquial sense) between x and f is denoted and quantified by C, that is, C quantifies how 
well x estimates f. Another way to state this is that C denotes the level-of-fit that x has to f. 
Here x and f usually vary across time because of environmental change, and C might 
gradually change as well because of changes in X or F. If C is small, then x is a poor estimate 
of f. If C is large, then x is a good estimate of f. If C is negligible (zero or close to zero), then x 
and f are unrelated. 
Note that X and what it does are introduced here and in (2) by assumption. However, in 
(7) below it is argued that X and what it does are evolvable and sustainable (see also van 
Hateren 2015). This makes the presence of X in a form similar to what is assumed here 
consistent with evolution by natural selection, and far from implausible. 
An analogy may help to understand how X and x are related to F and f. One can think of F 
as the weather (a dynamical process) with f then a single time-dependent variable of that 
process (e.g., the temperature at a particular place). Then X would be a simulation of the 
weather (such as running in a computer) with x the resulting estimate of the temperature at 
that same particular place. C then quantifies how well the simulation estimates that 
temperature, including how it changes over time. An accurate estimate means a large C, that 
is, it means a high level-of-fit that x has to f. Both the temperature f and its estimate x usually 




could increase when the simulation is improved (by refining the computer program), and it 
might decrease when the climate changes, which might render the assumptions that were used 
for the simulation less accurate. 
 
(5) Because x estimates fitness according to (4), large x is correlated with large fitness. A 
system is more likely, then, to reproduce during the time that it lingers, according to (3), at 
forms with large x. In effect, process (3) combined with (4) biases each system to spend more 
time at forms with large fitness than at forms with small fitness. As a result, this enhances the 
time-averaged likelihood that a system reproduces, that is, its average fitness is enhanced. 
This effect on the fitness of individual systems is gradual and slow, because it depends on the 
statistics of drifting through form-space. In order to stress the fact that fitness is not 
immediately affected but gradually, the resulting fitness will be denoted by ‘fitness-to-be’ 
below. ‘Fitness’ and f still refer to current fitness. 
Note that reproduction is increased here by combining two quite different mechanisms. 
The first mechanism, (2), utilizes conventional material causation. It increases the likelihood 
of having systems with large x according to (3). This mechanism would also work if x were 
unrelated to fitness, and it does not influence fitness-to-be by itself (i.e., the gradual increase 
of fitness is not a direct effect of x). The second mechanism, (4), is unconventional. It depends 
on x estimating f, which is denoted and quantified by C. By itself, this estimate (or its 
accuracy) has no direct effect on fitness-to-be either (because it lacks, by itself, a mechanism 
that can affect the structure of S and X). Separately, neither of the two mechanisms affect 
fitness-to-be. But in combination they do. 
 
(6) The efficiency of mechanism (5) is enhanced when the strength of the similarity C 
between x and fitness is increased, such as may result from random modifications of X in a 
system. The efficiency is enhanced, because a system with increased C is even more likely to 
reproduce when it lingers, according to (3), at forms with large x (since large x combined with 
a large C implies a higher fitness than large x combined with a small C). Therefore, 
mechanism (5) implies that, on average, an increase of C leads to an increase of fitness-to-be, 
that is, a higher fitness-to-be than would occur when C would not have been increased.  
 
(7) As already noted in (5), lingering at forms with large x would have no effect on 
reproduction if x were unrelated to fitness. Therefore, the similarity C between x and fitness is 
required for producing the slow effect on reproduction (i.e., the effect on fitness-to-be). 
Perturbing C tends to change the fitness-to-be that a system will reach, according to (6). 
Specifically, slightly increasing C will slightly increase fitness-to-be, and slightly decreasing 
C will slightly decrease it. Changing fitness-to-be in this way tends to change actual 
reproduction. Therefore, C is a factor with causal efficacy, that is, C is a cause. This argument 
complies with the standard (interventionist) use of causation as is discussed in Section 3.2.  
More specifically, one might perturb C by changing the structure of the processes X or F, 
or by changing aspects of the environment that affect x (through X) and f (through F) in 
different ways (see further the fourth paragraph of Section 3.2). For example, when the 
structure of X is changed such that C is increased (which is analogous to improving the 
computer program that simulates the weather), it just means that x then better estimates f (i.e., 
the level-of-fit that x has to f is then higher). It does not, by itself, change f (in the same sense 
as improving a weather simulation will not change the weather). But when x better matches f, 
the statistical clustering—towards large x—that results (via R) from mechanism (3) will better 
align with fitness; the better aligned clustering subsequently facilitates and enhances fitness. 




fitness-to-be. Alternatively, when the structure of X is changed such that C is decreased, 
alignment gradually decreases, and as a result fitness does so too.  
Note that C does not directly affect fitness (nor does it directly affect X, R, or S). It affects 
fitness only indirectly, slowly, and gradually, by enhancing the time-averaged likelihood that 
a system reproduces, through mechanism (5). This enhancement depends on the fact that 
mechanism (3) produces a basic tendency towards large x, with x being similar to fitness f 
because the X process has a structure that produces a large C. Mechanism (3) works through 
the conventional causal mechanism (2). Mechanism (2) does not directly depend on fitness, 
nor does it directly change fitness. Nevertheless, it is evolvable and sustainable, because it 
indirectly enhances fitness-to-be through (5). Mechanism (4) is evolvable and sustainable as 
well: the better x estimates fitness (i.e., the larger C), the higher the resulting fitness-to-be will 
become according to mechanism (6). Hence, there is selection pressure on X to produce large 
C. Mechanisms (2) and (4) can coevolve, because they reinforce each other. Moreover, 
initiating their evolution is facilitated by the fact that they are beneficial even when weakly 
present. 
 
(8) The major conclusion of (7) is that C is a cause. C gives system S a causal efficacy that 
still requires the material constitution of X, but that goes beyond the conventional physical 
efficacy of X as produced by its constituents (including their activities and interactions). The 
latter only influence R, by conventional material causation. However, an effect on fitness-to-
be occurs only when a non-negligible C is present as well. C acts as a cause, but it is a 
strongly emergent cause (in the sense of Bedau 1997, see Section 3.3). It produces a causal 
power that is ontologically novel, that is, the causal power does not follow completely from 
the micro-physical properties of X (nor from those of X and its environment, see Section 3.4). 
Novel causal powers are indicative of strong emergence. We conclude that C is a strongly 
emergent cause. 
 
(9) Perturbing C tends to slowly and gradually change the fitness of S. In particular, 
increasing C typically increases the fitness-to-be of S according to (7). Thus, increasing C is 
likely to have significant and directed material consequences (because it changes 
reproduction). In other words, the strongly emergent cause C can direct matter. In addition, C 
can be changed by material changes, such as in X. Hence, this provides an example where a 




Points (8) and (9) above show that the proposed material system produces a strongly emergent 
cause and that this cause can interact with conventional material ones. It is useful to state the 
more general reasons why this system can accomplish this. The main reasons are related to a 
cyclical use of nondeterminism, to evolution by natural selection, and to complementary 
causes. This is discussed further below, as an informal means to help the reader to 
comprehend the system explained in detail above. But before doing so, a major point is 
addressed that may appear confusing at first sight (that is, why C can have both an estimative 
and causal aspect). It concerns the basic question of how one should interpret C. 
Naively, when the system is first defined and before its dynamics are analysed, C is 
simply a standard level-of-fit that x has to f. Although it is an objective feature of the world 
(in the sense of being objectively assignable by any competent observer), it does not 
participate in the dynamics of the world. Thus, it has not much of an ontic standing. It is not 
an entity in the sense that it could influence, change or cause things. But because of the 




causal power (directed at fitness-to-be). It is its only causal power. Having this power makes 
C ontic: it becomes an entity in the above sense (see also the final paragraph of Section 3.2). 
C is then still a level-of-fit (and, technically, it still quantifies the accuracy by which x 
estimates f), but it is a non-standard level-of-fit, an ontic one with causal power.  
A potential source of confusion is that C seems to have a dual role in the analysis. On the 
one hand, it quantifies how well x estimates fitness—it is then simply the level-of-fit that x 
has to f. On the other hand, Section 2 claims that C is, in addition, a cause, namely a factor 
that affects fitness-to-be. Wouldn’t this amount to a category mistake, by using a single 
quantity, C, for two radically different notions (i.e., quantifying estimation and being a 
cause)? Moreover, estimation might be viewed as a merely descriptive and epistemic tool, 
presumably objective and real, but without causal clout in the real world. In contrast, the 
causal aspect of C is claimed to be ontological. Actually, there is no erroneous mix-up of 
categories here, but this is exactly the kind of categorical uncertainty that is to be expected of 
strong emergence. Prior conceptions of categories cannot suffice, because an entity with a 
novel causal power cannot appear just out of thin air. Novel causal power has to be acquired 
by something that is there already, even if this something is not yet a full-blown entity (such 
as C as a standard level-of-fit). A key point here is that the two aspects of C, related to 
estimation and causation, occur at different timescales. The estimative aspect of C occurs at a 
fast timescale, namely the one at which the components of X operate to produce an x that 
mimics f. The causal aspect of C—by which it affects fitness-to-be—occurs at a much slower 
timescale, namely the one at which fitness gradually increases through the statistical 
clustering mechanism of point (3) in Section 2. The two aspects are simultaneously there, but 
their dynamics occur at disparate timescales. The two aspects of C can thus operate alongside 
without significantly interfering with each other. The process X can easily let the estimate x of 
fitness follow the slow changes of fitness that depend on the clustering. In effect, estimation 
and causation are decoupled. 
The objection that estimation is only a human epistemic tool does not hold either. As is 
argued in the final paragraph of point (7) in Section 2, C is an evolvable cause. Hence, there is 
no dependence on humans or human epistemology when C evolves and acquires objective 
causal clout in the world. Nevertheless, one might view the estimative aspect of C as part of a 
primitive epistemology that has evolved within system S itself: the fact that x is ‘about’ f may 
be regarded as a primordial form of ‘knowledge’ (ascribable to S) about the world. Such a 
minimal epistemology is evolvable, because C has a causal aspect that promotes fitness. 
The proposed mechanism is nondeterministic (the term ‘nondeterministic’ is used here 
and below to denote ‘not completely deterministic’; see also Section 3.1), because it depends 
in a fundamental way on utilized randomness. When systems of the kind considered here are 
deterministic, any emergent causation may be classified as weak emergence (Bedau 1997; see 
Section 3.3). Such a classification also applies to most nondeterministic systems, that is, 
systems that combine determinism with randomness. Randomness usually does not contribute 
to novel causal powers; thus, involving randomness is not, by itself, sufficient for producing 
strong emergence. However, the nondeterministic system explained here is of a rather special 
kind. It couples deterministic and random factors in a cyclical and sustained way, such that it 
is impossible to separate them and impossible to neglect the effects of randomness. The 
randomness is even indispensable, because without the randomness there would be no effect 
on fitness-to-be and C would not be a cause. Importantly, the specific way by which 
deterministic and random factors are coupled (i.e., by how x and R are related) tends to 
increase fitness. In combination with selection pressure, this results in a stable factor with a 
strongly emergent causal efficacy, as explained in Section 2.  
Complementary causes are responsible for the fact that the emergent cause C can still 




one. The emergent causal aspect of X is produced by the fact that x is an estimate of fitness 
(as denoted and quantified by C). The presence of a non-negligible C is required for 
producing the effect on fitness-to-be. But actually producing this effect depends crucially on 
the material causal aspect of X, which is the fact that X is, in addition, a regular physical 
process occurring within system S. This physical process modulates the rate of change R of 
the system, through conventional material causation (such as by facilitating or counteracting 
the effects of random events4). Yet, this material causation can only affect fitness because of 
the emergent causal aspect of X. Exactly the same material causation, with the same X and x, 
would have no effect on fitness-to-be when x would not mimic fitness any more (for example, 
when fitness would have been drastically changed by large random disturbances of the 
environment). Thus X couples the emergent cause with the material cause. These causal 
aspects of X are complementary, because they are both indispensable. Neither of them can do 
the job alone. Therefore, the complementary causes produce neither epiphenomenalism, nor 
causal overdetermination. The mechanism does not require or produce a dualism of the 
Descartian type. Nevertheless, one might perhaps view it as letting some sort of dualism 
emerge from a physical monism. 
The proposed system is based on several fundamental assumptions, in particular that there 
is indeterminacy and that causation can be understood in a particular way. Moreover, it has 
consequences for several fundamental questions, in particular concerning the existence of 





A major aim of science is to uncover, systematize, and explain the law-like regularities that 
one can find in reality. However, it is a valid question whether reality is fully produced—
according to such regularities—in a determinate way (i.e., whether it is fully deterministic) or 
that reality is partly indeterminate (such as when some events occur randomly and without 
sufficient cause). For the construction explained above it is not necessary to consider this 
question in its most general form, pertaining to all of reality at once. It suffices to consider the 
constructed system combined with its causally relevant environment (i.e., the environment 
relevant for producing its evolutionary fitness). Let us call this combination the ‘inclusive 
system’. Above we assumed that there is some indeterminacy—in addition to law-like 
regularities—in the constructed and inclusive systems, in the form of random system 
modifications and (partly) random environmental change. The indeterminacy is called 
‘randomness’ here, and it is assumed to be present throughout the systems. Note that 
‘randomness’ refers here to temporal indeterminacy, and not to some structural property of a 
system (in the sense that one might call a spatial pattern less or more random). Although most 
engineered systems and many biological sub-systems specifically tend to reduce and control 
randomness (then usually referred to as ‘noise’), the proposed system specifically utilizes it. 
It is plausible that, in effect, any constructed or inclusive system indeed contains 
indeterminacy and is, thus, nondeterministic (i.e., not fully deterministic). This is plausible 
because no system is completely isolated from the rest of the universe. In classical physics, 
long-range electromagnetic and gravitational fields that originate from outside the inclusive 
system inevitably disturb it in an intractable way. Such influences are not negligible (for an 
extreme example see Berry 1988, who argues that even the unknown whereabouts of a single 
 
4 Such mechanisms are known in molecular biology; a simple (non-biological) way by which one can 
understand the concept of modulated randomness is when one would modulate the distance between a 




electron at the edge of the visible universe produces sufficient gravitational uncertainty to 
yield intractable molecular motion, here, within a tiny fraction of a second). In quantum 
physics, systems inevitably couple to their environment and subsequently decohere, 
producing indeterminate outcomes (as observables, irrespective of how one interprets the 
ontology of quantum physics). In any case, the constructed and inclusive systems contain 
indeterminacy that is either strictly ontic or at least indistinguishable from being strictly ontic.  
Empirically, indeterminacy is commonly observed in systems. At the submicroscopic 
scale there are indeterminate quantum events, at the microscopic scale there is thermal noise 
(random movements and interactions of molecules), and at larger scales there is 
indeterminacy caused by non-linear and unstable dynamics. The latter can readily amplify 
(sub-)microscopic indeterminacy to macroscopic scales. Such instabilities are known to be 
very common in dynamical systems. A dramatic example is a study by Laskar and Gastineau 
(2009), who show that infinitesimal causes can have runaway effects even in the planetary 
system. Similarly, it is clear that biological systems (ranging from the cellular to the neural 
and behavioural level) are nondeterministic to a considerable extent (e.g., Balázsi et al. 2011; 




The explanation of the proposed system utilizes cause-and-effect language. Such language has 
many uses in many different fields, and it has proven difficult to define causation in a way 
that covers all such uses at once (for an overview of different approaches see Illari and Russo 
2014). However, the proposed system belongs to the realm of the basic (matter-oriented) 
natural sciences, in particular the ones that deal with complex material systems (such as 
occur, for example, in cellular physiology, neuroscience, and atmospheric science). Within 
these fields, causality is usually captured by making a mechanistic model of the investigated 
system. The model—such as the one presented in Section 2—then contains the conjectured 
causal structure of the mechanisms or processes involved. The importance of mechanisms and 
mechanistic causation in the sciences has recently become the focus of a range of studies 
(e.g., Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007; 
Illari and Williamson 2012; Glennan 2017). Much of this work has a reductive flavour, that is, 
it is consistent with ontological reduction of causation. However, the term ‘mechanism’ is 
used in this article in a general sense, not necessarily reductively and not necessarily referring 
to deterministic systems. 
The causal structure of mechanistic systems can be probed either by an empirical 
intervention (i.e., through an experiment on an actual system), or by a theoretical intervention 
(i.e., by mathematical or computational analysis of a modelled system). Interventions are 
typically performed by slightly perturbing (altering) some part of a system. When a system is 
thus perturbed (or would be perturbed), and subsequently some part of it tends to respond in a 
statistically reproducible way (or would do so), then one can infer that a causal connection 
exists. This strategy (perturb and observe the consequences) was used in point (7) of Section 2 
to show that C is a cause of fitness-to-be. The strategy is standing practice in science, being 
closely related to interventionist approaches to causation that are discussed in the philosophy 
of science (Woodward 2013) and in statistics (Pearl 2009).5 
 
5 One might worry that an interventionist approach would be difficult here if there is a causal loop 
from C to fitness and from fitness back to C. However, such a loop does not occur here. Fitness does 
not directly affect C (f will usually change all the time because of environmental change, but x can 
normally follow that, keeping C unaltered; compare this to the fact that the weather normally does not 




Yet, there are valuable alternatives to the interventionist approach. One may then wonder 
whether such alternatives would also classify C as a cause. A few examples are briefly 
discussed here. First, a counter-factual take on causation would indeed classify C as a cause: 
if C had been negligible (i.e., if x would have been unrelated to f), an effect on fitness-to-be 
would not have obtained either. Again, the effect that is meant here is the gradual and slow 
effect produced by the drift-related process utilized in mechanism (3) of Section 2. A second 
possibility is to equate causation with the existence of a productive causal mechanism 
between cause and effect (see Glennan 2017, Ch. 7, and the remarks above about capturing 
causation through a mechanistic model). Using this approach again leads to the conclusion 
that C is a cause: there is indeed a (stochastic) mechanism (as explained in Section 2) that 
produces a change of fitness-to-be when C is changed. As a final possibility one may assume 
that causation requires that something (e.g., energy) is transferred from cause to effect. Both 
in applied and fundamental physics this is typically the case (for an extended version of the 
transference theory see Ardourel and Guay 2018). However, it is not immediately clear what 
C might transfer to fitness-to-be. Given the mechanism, whatever is transferred must at least 
involve something statistical, such as entropy or information. But it would require further 
analysis to see what is going on in terms of transfer.  
The argument in point (7) of Section 2, as well as several of the alternatives discussed 
above, establish that C is a cause. One might object that the true cause may not be C but rather 
the X process (through x), because C depends on x. However, such an argument would ignore 
the fact that C also depends on the process F (through f), since C denotes how well x mimics f. 
A perturbation of C could result from perturbing X or F or both. It could even be produced by 
an environmental change that affects X and F in different ways. The effect of such changes 
depends on changes in C, because mechanism (3) of Section 2 does nothing but letting S 
cluster around large values of x, which can only change fitness-to-be in relation to how 
similar x is to f (that is, depending on the value of C). No change of fitness-to-be will occur 
when C is not changed. The latter may occur even when X, F, and the environment all change 
but approximately compensate each other. This is possible because X and F are two separate, 
physically unrelated processes that can be perturbed independently (compare that to the fact 
that a weather simulation and the weather can be perturbed independently). The key point 
here is that any change must always run via a change in C in order to affect fitness-to-be. In 
other words, C is the crucial, indispensable causal factor in this mechanism. 
The above discussion on causation primarily concerns how scientific knowledge about 
causes and causation is acquired, that is, it is primarily related to the epistemology of 
causation. On the assumption of realism, scientific knowledge should somehow correspond to 
or refer to what actually exists (i.e., to the ontology of reality). This is often unproblematic, 
such as when referring to well-studied objects and their characteristics (e.g., a specific planet 
or a specific molecule). But causation and the associated law-like regularities are more 
problematic, because it is not clear to what extent fundamental physical laws or fundamental 
causal dispositions are ontological (see, e.g., Mumford and Anjum 2011; Bird 2016). 
However, at non-fundamental levels (such as used for the system proposed here) this problem 
can be avoided. When one assumes a mechanistic framework, one can explain what a 
particular mechanism causes (i.e., which outcome it produces) by the activities and 
interactions of its components (Machamer et al. 2000; Illari and Williamson 2012; Glennan 
2017). Such components and how they (inter-)act are then taken as given facts, with an 
ontology that need not be known in all its details. This strategy thus avoids entering a long 
 
deeper reason for this asymmetry is that the latter change depends on a driven diffusive mechanism 




regress of explanations at lower and lower levels, of which it is not clear if and how it bottoms 
out.  
If a particular cause can be completely explained by the above strategy, then such a cause 
can be said to be amenable to ontological reduction in the sense of Van Gulick (2001). For 
example, it is assumed above that x—if interpreted as a cause of R—is fully explained by the 
detailed workings of X. Then the ontology of the cause x is reducible to the ontology of the 
components of X (including their interactions). Similarly, it is assumed that f—if interpreted 
as a cause of reproduction—is fully explained by the ontological details of system S, its 
environment, and their interactions (i.e., it is explained by the process F). This implies that 
such causes are not autonomous, but rather are produced by other causes, namely those at the 
component level. Although such non-autonomous causes are objective and real, they have no 
independent causal power6. The causal power of a non-autonomous cause is then fully defined 
by the causal powers of its constituents (including their interactions).  
However, the ontology of the emergent cause C—as affecting fitness-to-be—is different. 
Its causal power is autonomous in the sense that it is not fully defined by the causal powers of 
the constituents of the system and its environment. This is so, because an indispensable part of 
the causal power of C is produced by randomness (which has no fixed ontology and does not 
correspond to constituents with causal powers). The randomness is indispensable, because 
without it C would not be a cause and there would be no effect on fitness-to-be. A cause C 
with autonomous causal power must be an autonomous entity. This is based on the notion that 
something that has the potential to influence other entities (by having some sort of causal 
power) has to exist, i.e., has to be an entity. Having causal autonomy (distinctive efficacy) 
then guarantees ontological autonomy (distinctness), by Leibniz’s law (identicals are 
indiscernible, thus discernibles are not identical); see Wilson (2015, p. 372). In other words, 
the causal analysis of the proposed system shows that it produces a novel, emergent entity C 




The mechanism explained above produces emergence. A general discussion of emergence is 
beyond the scope of this article (but see the anthologies by Bedau and Humphreys 2008 and 
Gibb et al. 2019, as well as Wilson 2015; Gillett 2016; Humphreys 2016; O’Connor 2020). 
Nevertheless, it is important to indicate where the proposed mechanism is positioned within 
the field studying emergence. Guay and Sartenaer (2016) usefully distinguish three 
dimensions along which one can analyse emergence. First, their ontological-epistemological 
axis distinguishes ontological emergence (which is ‘out there’ in the natural world) from 
epistemological emergence (which is just a consequence of our representation of the natural 
world). Second, their strong-weak axis corresponds to the extent to which emergence is 
present fundamentally (my take on what they mean by ‘in principle’) or only in practice. 
Finally, their synchronic-diachronic axis corresponds to whether the emergent phenomenon 
(such as an event, a property, or a process) occurs simultaneously with its constituents (such 
as events, properties, or processes) or distinctly later in time. 
In other literature (e.g., Bedau 1997; Chalmers 2006; Kim 2006), the ontological-
epistemological and strong-weak dimensions of Guay and Sartenaer (2016) are often 
combined into two broad possibilities for emergence, denoted by ‘strong emergence’ and 
‘weak emergence’ (see also O’Connor 2020). Weakly emergent phenomena are then novel 
 
6 Having ‘causal power’ is used in this article in the general and weak sense of having a disposition, 
tendency, or propensity to produce certain effects; the use of the term here does not assume a specific 




and surprising primarily for epistemological reasons. A system may be so complex that its 
properties and dynamics cannot be explained in simple terms. In principle, one could simulate 
the microdynamics of such a system and, thus, reproduce the emergent phenomenon (Bedau 
1997, 2008). The phenomenon is then explained computationally, but it is still novel and 
surprising. Strongly emergent phenomena, on the other hand, are novel and surprising 
primarily for ontological reasons. In particular, such phenomena produce novel causal powers 
that are not explainable in terms of those of the components of the system and its environment 
(Kim 2006, 2010). 
The type of emergence produced by the system that is proposed here can be 
unequivocally positioned on two of the three axes of Guay and Sartenaer (2016): it is 
ontological and present fundamentally. But the position on the synchronic-diachronic axis is 
more complex. A purely synchronic relation between constituents and emergent may be 
viewed as one of dependence or constitution (e.g., Gillett 2016). However, the present study 
assumes a regular matter-based system, which thus has to be consistent with fundamental 
physics. All of the fundamental theories of physics contain differential equations of time; 
hence it is difficult to see how such a system could produce emergence that is both 
ontological and purely synchronic (see also remarks and references on this topic in Guay and 
Sartenaer 2016, p. 301). Pure synchronicity depends on connecting properties (or events, or 
processes) at different positions at the same time, which fundamental physics cannot do (at 
least not in a sense relevant for the current study).  
That the emergence produced by the proposed system is not purely synchronic is also 
implied by the fact that it focusses on causation (in the sense of producing effects), which—in 
matter-based systems—inevitably involves time delays. However, it would be inappropriate 
to characterize the emergence here as diachronic. The constituent causes (involved in how X 
produces x and thus modulates randomness) and the emergent cause (C) act continuously and 
spread out in time. The emergent cause-and-effect relation (between C and fitness-to-be) 
builds up statistically and gradually. It occurs on a much slower timescale than the constituent 
cause-and-effect relations within X. Yet, these constituents and the emergent cause C overlap 
in time to a considerable degree, that is, they occur almost simultaneously. They do not occur 
at clearly separable, distinct moments in time (as would be required for pure diachronicity)7. 
Therefore, the emergence is best characterized as near-synchronic. In order to keep the 
formulations in this article simple, the term ‘strong emergence’ is used here to refer to the 
near-synchronic, ontological, and fundamentally present emergence of a causal power. In the 
terminology of Van Gulick (2001), strong emergence as used here corresponds to a radical-
kind emergence of a causal power.  
A specific form of emergence, where an ontological transformation occurs across time, is 
called transformational emergence (Humphreys 2016, Ch. 2; Guay and Sartenaer 2016). One 
may wonder whether the proposed system could be understood in those terms, as one might 
think that C is transformed from a simple level-of-fit to a cause. However, nothing is 
transformed here, because C remains a level-of-fit and the causal power is just an emergent 
addition. Moreover, transformational emergence is diachronic, whereas the emergence 
proposed here is not: C is simultaneously a level-of-fit and a cause, even as the dynamics of 
these two aspects occur at mostly different timescales. 
Finally, one may wonder what would be the emergence base from which C emerges. 
From Section 2 and Fig. 1 it is clear that many different parts of the world are participating in 
 
7 Note that the notion of causation taken here is more general than the traditional notion of event 
causation (i.e., one distinct event causing another distinct event). This is necessary, because 
mechanisms (such as the one proposed here) often do not operate with discrete events, but rather 




producing C: system S and its components, as well as the environment, which coproduces 
fitness. But a crucial part of the emergence base that is not explicitly represented in Fig. 1 is 
ontic randomness, without which C would not be a cause. Yet, ontic randomness is not 
definable in a definite way, because its concurrent outcomes are not determined before they 
occur. Only with hindsight one could reconstruct the randomness and its consequences. But 
hindsight is a form of epistemology that is not available to the mechanism itself, including 
during the time that C gradually causes fitness-to-be (see also below). Therefore, the concept 
of a definite emergence base cannot be applied to the proposed mechanism, at least not in an 
exact way. 
 
3.4 Materialism and physicalism 
 
According to point (8) in Section 2, C is a strongly emergent cause. But is C a material cause? 
The answer to this question depends on how one interprets the meaning of the term ‘material’. 
As indicated by the first sentence of the Introduction, we will take it as referring to being fully 
produced by law-like interactions of matter-energy, in any combination. Thus, it is not 
restricted to mere matter, but also includes, for example, forces and fields. This is consistent 
with how the term ‘material’ is commonly understood in the natural sciences (including by 
those working on complex material systems). The common interpretation is that a material 
cause is a cause that would be completely specified by its material constitution, that is, by its 
material constituents and their activities and interactions8. Moreover, the material constitution 
must be well-defined and must be knowable, at least in principle. This implies that such a 
cause is amenable to ontological reduction (in the sense of Van Gulick 2001), at least in 
theory: if one would reassemble the full material constitution from scratch9, then one would 
get exactly one’s material cause and its efficacy, no less and no more. A second common 
interpretation of material causation is based on the notion (e.g., Wilson 2015, p. 351) that 
causation is first of all a cause-and-effect relation between spatiotemporally located goings-on 
(with ‘goings-on’ standing for events or processes). Then material causation can be 
interpreted as a cause-and-effect relation between the material events or processes to which 
such goings-on correspond (i.e., to which they can be reduced ontologically). If either one of 
these two common interpretations of material causation does not apply, then it seems best not 
to regard the causation as material in the conventional sense of the term. As is argued below, 
neither of these interpretations does in fact apply to C. 
The first interpretation does not apply because there is no suitable basis for an ontological 
reduction of C (or, in alternative formulations, a basis on which C supervenes or a basis by 
which C is realized). One might think that C could be reduced to the material process (X) that 
is required for producing C and its effect on fitness-to-be. This might be so, because the value 
of x is fully produced by the material constituents of X, and the effect of C on fitness-to-be 
depends on how x modulates R, the rate of random change. However, such a reduction cannot 
work, because C depends not only on x, but also on fitness f (recall that C quantifies how well 
x estimates f). Fitness depends on interactions of the system S and its environment, which 
both extend beyond X. Therefore, X is not sufficient for specifying C, nor for specifying the 
effect of C on fitness-to-be. 
 
8 In the context of physicalism, Hüttemann and Papineau (2005) argue for distinguishing part-whole 
reduction and inter-level reduction (e.g., when connecting the mental and physical levels). No such 
distinction would apply to the current study, because it focusses on a single, well-understood level 
(chemistry-based physiology, see Section 1). 
9 For open or nondeterministic systems this could include external contingencies (i.e., randomness) 




Alternatively, one might think that C could be reduced to a broadened basis, which 
includes not only X and S, but also any part of the environment that is relevant for fitness. 
Such a reduction cannot work either, as is argued next. The effect of C on fitness-to-be is 
stochastic, being produced slowly and gradually by modulated random change. This 
randomness is assumed to be ontic, which means that each individual change is indeterminate 
up until the short time interval during which it is produced (this remains true also when the 
statistics of changes are modulated over time). The specific outcome of each change only 
becomes determinate during this production, but before that it is fully indeterminate: not just 
epistemologically (due to lack of knowledge about the system) but ontologically (irrespective 
of how completely the production could be characterized; see also Section 3.1). The effect of 
C on fitness-to-be is slow, thus it depends on the specific outcomes of a series of individual 
changes during a stretch of time. The system compounds this effect over time in such a way 
that the probability distribution of each subsequent change, as well as its micro-effects, 
depend on the results of previous changes (because these results partly determine how the 
system subsequently modulates randomness). This means that ontological reduction as 
defined above is not possible: one could not reassemble the material constitution of the 
broadened basis—over the stretch of time where C assembles its effect on fitness-to-be—from 
scratch, because randomness prevents reproducing this constitution. This is so, because 
randomness would produce a different material constitution each time when one would 
attempt such a reassembly: the constituents and their activities and interactions would not be 
the same. Consequently, not only the sequence of forms of X and S would be significantly 
different each time, but also C and its effect on fitness-to-be. Therefore, the causal efficacy of 
C is not fully given by its ontological basis, because that basis stretches across time and is 
partly indeterminate10. Of course, one could observe the specific realizations of the random 
changes of X and S over a stretch of time (after the fact) and use those for faithfully 
reproducing the cause C and its effect, from scratch. But that would be cheating, because a 
reproduced series of random changes is not indeterminate, but determinate (and thus not 
random; recall that the terms random, indeterminate, and determinate are all used here in an 
ontological sense). That would fundamentally change the ontology of the system that is 
presented here, in effect taking it to be fully deterministic. We must conclude, therefore, that 
C cannot be reduced ontologically, not even in a broadened basis.  
The second commonly used interpretation of material causation, that it is a relation 
between spatiotemporally located goings-on of a material kind, does not apply either. The 
effect, an increase of fitness-to-be, is a going-on of the right kind, because fitness 
characterizes a material process (reproduction) that is fully produced—in a complex way—by 
the physical properties of system S and those of its environment. However, the cause of this 
increase, C, is not a material going-on, as is argued next. C denotes and quantifies how well x 
estimates fitness, and this estimation is in fact the crucial condition for C acting as a cause. An 
estimate is, roughly speaking, a relation of some kind11. The process that produces x, X, is a 
material going-on, and the same goes for the process that results in f. However, the fact that C 
is a cause (by slowly affecting fitness-to-be) is fully attributable to the relation between x and 
 
10 Note that this is not an epistemological issue, but an ontological one: even the system itself could 
not construct the causal aspect of C before that aspect is slowly and gradually produced through a 
series of changes, because each change remains indeterminate even to the system itself until the short 
time interval in which it is produced. 
11 In a proper (two-sided) relation, A being related to B entails that B is related to A (though often in a 
different way). In contrast, an estimate is one-sided: the estimate points to the estimated, but the 
estimated does not point to the estimate. Here x points to f, but f does not point to x (only the former is 





f as such (see the fourth paragraph of Section 3.2). This relation, as such, is not a material, 
spatiotemporally located going-on. Essentially, it is a similarity between two values as they 
evolve over time, somewhat like a correlation (but more constrained, because the specific 
value of x needs to be close to the specific value of f, on average). A relation between two 
values does not consist of material events or processes. There is no way in which a relation 
between two values is identical to—in the sense of being indistinguishably replaceable by—a 
material event or process. Relations between values belong to a different category than 
material events and processes. We conclude that causation here is not a relation between two 
material goings-on, but is a relation between a relation of some kind (the estimative aspect of 
C) and a material going-on (the material process characterized by fitness-to-be). Therefore, 
the causal aspect of C fails to comply with the second interpretation of material causation. 
Because C does not comply with both common interpretations of material causation, we 
must conclude that the cause C is best regarded as non-material12. Hence, if the proposed 
system were constructed (or variants of it actually exist), it would be a counter-example 
against materialism. However, one should not conclude from this that the cause C is non-
physical as well, as this depends on how broadly one defines the term ‘physical’. One might 
argue that anything real that exists must be physical, by definition (Strawson 2008), that 
anything that occurs in the physical realm (including uncaused random events) is physical, 
and that anything that emerges from that is automatically physical as well. Then C would be a 
physical cause, along with any other possible cause (if one assumes naturalism). Thus, the 
current proposal is consistent with physicalism, if that is broadly defined.  
Nevertheless, the mechanism as proposed here is incompatible with common, more 
narrow conceptions of physicalism. Arguments against the existence of strong emergence 
often depend on the thesis that the physical realm is causally closed, such as “Every physical 
effect has an immediate sufficient physical cause, in so far as it has a sufficient physical cause 
at all” (Papineau 2009). The ‘immediate’ is included in order to exclude causal chains running 
indirectly through a non-physical cause, and can be ignored here. The thesis appears to be 
correct for deterministic processes, and it is silent about uncaused random events (because of 
the ‘in so far .. at all’). But it is not obvious that the thesis, or any variant of it, is always true 
of processes that are both deterministic and random. The mechanism explained above is in 
fact a realizable counterexample against physical causal closure13. It clearly has a physical 
effect, on fitness-to-be and thus on reproduction. It produces this effect by systematically 
utilizing randomness (via x and R) to produce deterministic effects (via the structure of S and 
X) that subsequently modulate further randomness (via x and R), and so on. This continual 
cycle of mixing determinism and randomness produces an effect on fitness-to-be that is of 
mixed origin: both caused and uncaused. The cycle is complex, nonlinear, and nonstationary, 
making it impossible—not only in practice, but fundamentally—to disentangle the causal 
effect that C has on fitness-to-be in terms of physical causes and uncaused randomness. More 
specifically, the cause C produces its effect on fitness-to-be by an inseparable composite of 
physical causes and uncaused randomness. One might think that the ‘in so far as it has a 
sufficient physical cause at all’ could deal with this, but that is not so. As the definition 
stands, ‘in so far .. at al’ seems to be equivalent to ‘if’, and is intended to exclude ontic 
randomness (Papineau 2009). It does not deal with causation of mixed origin. We might 
change the definition by removing the ‘at all’, and hope that ‘in so far as’ (i.e., ‘to the extent 
that’) works for the current mechanism. However, this would tacitly assume that one can 
 
12 Material causation is undermined here even if one thinks that only one of the two interpretations is 
convincingly discredited. 
13 At least for any physical system that is not equal to the entire universe at once; the latter is not 




separate the effect on fitness-to-be in a caused and an uncaused part, which is not the case. 
Thus, ‘in so far as it has a sufficient physical cause’ is inapplicable here; it is meaningless 
with respect to the proposed mechanism.  
Still, some form of physical closure might be formulated by saying something like “Every 
physical going-on that is caused, is caused by nothing other than physical goings-on or causes 
that are strongly emergent from physical goings-on.” The term ‘physical going-on’ denotes 
here any form of physical change, irrespective of whether it is determinate, random, or mixed. 
Then the physical domain is still closed in some sense, but it is not necessarily causally closed 
(because any strongly emergent cause, such as C, would be a metaphysical novelty, though 
still physical if that is broadly defined).  
Van Gulick (2001) states that mainstream (‘atomistic’) physicalism assumes two core 
principles, namely AP1 “the features of macro items are determined by the features of their 
micro parts plus their mode of combination” and AP2 “The only law-like regularities needed 
for the determination of macro features by micro features are those that govern the 
interactions of those micro features in all contexts, systemic or otherwise.” The mechanism 
presented here conforms with AP1, but not with AP2. For example, the process X is, as a 
matter-based process, fully defined by how its micro items are combined (as in AP1). 
However, the interactions of its micro features are not the only law-like regularities that are 
needed for understanding the causal efficacy of X (contra AP2). In addition, the emergent 
law-like regularity “the factor C, which depends on X, affects fitness-to-be” is needed. This 
regularity is not fully defined by X, nor by X and its context (i.e., by the inclusive system). It 
is a slow regularity that is established stochastically and gradually, and that depends on how 
well x keeps estimating f over time. Thus, it depends on how the inclusive system and the 
environmental statistics change over time, potentially a long time into the future. Of course, S 
cannot really tell the future, but has to rely here on the predictive qualities of its X process, 
the structure of which was gradually established—through natural selection—over time, 
potentially a long time into the past. This deviates from the standard assumptions of 
mainstream physicalism (as well as from those of a non-mainstream version as in Papineau 
2008). Such standard assumptions are that the causal fate of any system is fully determined by 
the current system and its current environment, plus possibly some current external 
contingencies (for open or nondeterministic systems; see Bedau 1997). An explicit and 
irreducible statistical dependence on the (nondeterminate) future form of a system and the 
(nondeterminate) future environmental statistics, as applies to the mechanism explained here, 
is not part of the standard view. Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism is fully consistent 




The mechanism constructed above shows that strong emergence—taken here to be the near-
synchronic, ontological, and fundamentally present emergence of a causal power—is feasible 
in a universe that appears to be fully based on micro-physical laws. This is enabled by the fact 
that randomness escapes such laws, at least in its detailed realizations (i.e., its actual 
outcomes). The proposed mechanism takes advantage of this nondeterministic loophole in the 
apparent law-like nature of reality. An internal estimator of a system’s own reproductive 
fitness thus produces a slow and gradual increase of fitness, by stochastic means. As a result, 
the estimate of fitness obtains a novel quality, namely that of being a—strongly emergent—
cause of fitness-to-be. It thus provides an example of how strong causal emergence can be 
realized in a material system. If it actually exists in one form or another, it may explain 
several of the more puzzling phenomena that occur in living organisms (see van Hateren 
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